Thoughts in response to Ronald Dworkin's Justice for Hedgehogs
(notes from book and some outside sources)
Justice for Hedgehogs considered a "universal theory of value" (according to Thomas Nagel in "Ronald Dworkin: The Moral Quest, New York Review of Books, Nov. 21, 2013). Dworkin evolved his philosophy from Hume's idea that you can't derive an ought from an is, that is just because something "is" a certain way, it does not mean it should be that way. There must be an evaluative premise.
D's premise is that value judgments are "right or wrong" and their rightness or wrongness comes not from your own world view or how you feel or cultural perspective, but from what is supported by the best reasons and the best argument (not in a rhetorical sense; this isn't about who argues better, but in the sense that you come to the table with a deep concern for finding the "right" answer). The best reasons and arguments must come from the same domain we are evaluating and thus questions of value must come from the domain of values. Moral judgments can only be evaluated by moral argument.
D held that the right method for discovering truth was that
1. the domain of value is a unity and its components must be consistent with each other. Thus, you can't value liberty and justice and have them contradict.
2. the process of determining value is one of interpretation, "trying to make the best unified sense of the whole system of our judgments good and bad, by testing each of them in the light of others" (Nagel).
3. Dignity is the central value that unifies our values and has two components: equality (showing all equal concern) and individual responsibility (see below for D's discussion of these).
The best life is not the richest or even the happiest, the best life is that which ensures dignity for all persons.
D's evaluative basis of interpretation: D makes the distinction in interpretation between making the best sense of something and giving it a reading that is as good as possible, by good as possible, D means the best interpretation is the one that makes the thing being interpreted better than the other interpretation.
Law, D believed, is a part of morality in that a society must make decisions about what is morally correct to coerce other people to do or not to do, and they must make those decisions from some value. D would argue that this value is not subjective but is what is supported by the best arguments or reasons based on dignity for all, even if this is inconsistent with precedent or other arguments.
Justice for Hedgehogs notes
Hedgehog vs. fox--hedgehog focuses on one big thing (in this case, for Dworkin, that is value ("the truth about living well and being good and what is wonderful", p. 1), the fox, many small things. hedgehogs are unifiers; foxes are multipliers. I guess I don't know enough about either foxes or hedgehogs to understand the analogy.
Chapter 1 Baedeker
Justice
Equality: governments are made legitimate, according to Dworkin, if they show equal concern for the fate of all people and if they respect every person's responsibility to decide how to "make something valuable of his life" (p. 2). In reading Jojo Moye's book, Me Before You, I was struck with the tension between a once very active and now quadriplegic young man's decision to commit suicide and the resistance of all around him to his choice (including the government). Would Dworkin include this as a government's responsibility, to let someone end his/her life?
Liberty
D makes a distinction between freedom which is our ability to do whatever we want and liberty that which the government should not have the right to constrain. The rights that we are allotted if we are to be at liberty are those that honor equal concern for the fate of all people and responsibility to make value.
Democracy
D agrees that traditional notions of democracy might lead to violations of liberty and justice. So, he redefines it to a "partnership" democracy where not only does each person have an equal voice but they also have an equal stake in the consequences.
Law
Some laws conflict with these notions of liberty and justice. But Dworkin believes that laws should follow from morality.
Interpretation
We must agree on what it means to "interpret". For D, interpreters have critical responsibilities and that is to best realize the responsibilities for the given occasion. (hopefully, more on this later)
Truth and Value
Politics must be based on the belief that these policies come from what is really true (even if what is really true is impossible to determine) rather than what is expedient, or comes from tradition or feels right. Our politics must come from a theory of moral objectivity so we must be able to articulate our theory of what we think that moral objectivity is. D argues for independence of value that comes from an argument that shows that these moral judgments are "right" even if no one thought they were. They do not depend on how we think. Independence of value, moral judgments are true only because a substantive argument can be made in their favor.
Responsibility
In a discussion about someone's moral beliefs we can expect moral responsibility, or what D labels moral epistemology. There is a responsibility to use "good thinking" and not bad thinking
(Definitions: ethics is the study of how to live well and morality is the study of how to treat others)
Ethics
D argues that we all have the responsibility to make something of value of our own lives that comes from the desire to lead a good live that is, according to D, authentic, worthy and with dignity. It is, argues D, objectively important how each person lives.
Morality
In order to lead a life of dignity we must have respect for the humanity of others (what Laurie and I were calling generosity of spirit).
A Just so Story
Ancient philosophers argue that ethics demands that we seek "happiness" and by happiness we mean a "successful life conceived as a whole" (p. 15). Early and middle Christianity looked to god for what living well looked like, what God told them to do. But philosophers of the enlightenment destroyed that conception, arguing that we must develop beliefs that are based on an objective sense of truth: reason, empirical measurements, the natural sciences. So, on one hand we had God and faith to go on and on the other we had that which is outside of us and can be measured.
D turns to Hume's principle that we cannot discover the ultimate truth about human nature without a further premise of what ought to be. There has to be something outside of the claim that proves it. D argues that this is not a pessimistic skepticism but acknowledgement that moral truth is a different kind of knowing and requires its own standards of inquiry and justification. In effect, morality and ethics are philosophically independent and must be evaluated within their system. The most fundamental questions about morality and ethics are moral questions not metaphysical. For example, if we are going to argue that gay marriage is always wrong, we must base that argument on moral arguments. Philosophers are often uncomfortable with this claim, arguing that it is "quietism" (p. 25).
From Kant, D draws further, stating that a successful, well-lived life comes from dignity and self-respect that arises only from respect for humanity itself. So, Kan'ts principle, according to D, is that it is from a deep regard for human dignity that our happiness is predicated. In this conception, morality and ethics are unified. Through treating others with dignity (morality) we live a good live (ethics).
Part I
Independence, p. 21
Truth in Morals
"The Ordinary View" is the belief that some moral opinions are objectively true, p. 27
D argues in this chapter that in order to judge moral systems you need to judge them from within the morality system itself. You can not use external sources of judgment.
Moral judgments are true when they are made true through an "adequate moral argument for their truth" (p. 37). The emphasis is on adequate. Not all arguments are adequate. We are responsible for thinking about the argument in the right way
Justice for Hedgehogs considered a "universal theory of value" (according to Thomas Nagel in "Ronald Dworkin: The Moral Quest, New York Review of Books, Nov. 21, 2013). Dworkin evolved his philosophy from Hume's idea that you can't derive an ought from an is, that is just because something "is" a certain way, it does not mean it should be that way. There must be an evaluative premise.
D's premise is that value judgments are "right or wrong" and their rightness or wrongness comes not from your own world view or how you feel or cultural perspective, but from what is supported by the best reasons and the best argument (not in a rhetorical sense; this isn't about who argues better, but in the sense that you come to the table with a deep concern for finding the "right" answer). The best reasons and arguments must come from the same domain we are evaluating and thus questions of value must come from the domain of values. Moral judgments can only be evaluated by moral argument.
D held that the right method for discovering truth was that
1. the domain of value is a unity and its components must be consistent with each other. Thus, you can't value liberty and justice and have them contradict.
2. the process of determining value is one of interpretation, "trying to make the best unified sense of the whole system of our judgments good and bad, by testing each of them in the light of others" (Nagel).
3. Dignity is the central value that unifies our values and has two components: equality (showing all equal concern) and individual responsibility (see below for D's discussion of these).
The best life is not the richest or even the happiest, the best life is that which ensures dignity for all persons.
D's evaluative basis of interpretation: D makes the distinction in interpretation between making the best sense of something and giving it a reading that is as good as possible, by good as possible, D means the best interpretation is the one that makes the thing being interpreted better than the other interpretation.
Law, D believed, is a part of morality in that a society must make decisions about what is morally correct to coerce other people to do or not to do, and they must make those decisions from some value. D would argue that this value is not subjective but is what is supported by the best arguments or reasons based on dignity for all, even if this is inconsistent with precedent or other arguments.
Justice for Hedgehogs notes
Hedgehog vs. fox--hedgehog focuses on one big thing (in this case, for Dworkin, that is value ("the truth about living well and being good and what is wonderful", p. 1), the fox, many small things. hedgehogs are unifiers; foxes are multipliers. I guess I don't know enough about either foxes or hedgehogs to understand the analogy.
Chapter 1 Baedeker
Justice
Equality: governments are made legitimate, according to Dworkin, if they show equal concern for the fate of all people and if they respect every person's responsibility to decide how to "make something valuable of his life" (p. 2). In reading Jojo Moye's book, Me Before You, I was struck with the tension between a once very active and now quadriplegic young man's decision to commit suicide and the resistance of all around him to his choice (including the government). Would Dworkin include this as a government's responsibility, to let someone end his/her life?
Liberty
D makes a distinction between freedom which is our ability to do whatever we want and liberty that which the government should not have the right to constrain. The rights that we are allotted if we are to be at liberty are those that honor equal concern for the fate of all people and responsibility to make value.
Democracy
D agrees that traditional notions of democracy might lead to violations of liberty and justice. So, he redefines it to a "partnership" democracy where not only does each person have an equal voice but they also have an equal stake in the consequences.
Law
Some laws conflict with these notions of liberty and justice. But Dworkin believes that laws should follow from morality.
Interpretation
We must agree on what it means to "interpret". For D, interpreters have critical responsibilities and that is to best realize the responsibilities for the given occasion. (hopefully, more on this later)
Truth and Value
Politics must be based on the belief that these policies come from what is really true (even if what is really true is impossible to determine) rather than what is expedient, or comes from tradition or feels right. Our politics must come from a theory of moral objectivity so we must be able to articulate our theory of what we think that moral objectivity is. D argues for independence of value that comes from an argument that shows that these moral judgments are "right" even if no one thought they were. They do not depend on how we think. Independence of value, moral judgments are true only because a substantive argument can be made in their favor.
Responsibility
In a discussion about someone's moral beliefs we can expect moral responsibility, or what D labels moral epistemology. There is a responsibility to use "good thinking" and not bad thinking
(Definitions: ethics is the study of how to live well and morality is the study of how to treat others)
Ethics
D argues that we all have the responsibility to make something of value of our own lives that comes from the desire to lead a good live that is, according to D, authentic, worthy and with dignity. It is, argues D, objectively important how each person lives.
Morality
In order to lead a life of dignity we must have respect for the humanity of others (what Laurie and I were calling generosity of spirit).
A Just so Story
Ancient philosophers argue that ethics demands that we seek "happiness" and by happiness we mean a "successful life conceived as a whole" (p. 15). Early and middle Christianity looked to god for what living well looked like, what God told them to do. But philosophers of the enlightenment destroyed that conception, arguing that we must develop beliefs that are based on an objective sense of truth: reason, empirical measurements, the natural sciences. So, on one hand we had God and faith to go on and on the other we had that which is outside of us and can be measured.
D turns to Hume's principle that we cannot discover the ultimate truth about human nature without a further premise of what ought to be. There has to be something outside of the claim that proves it. D argues that this is not a pessimistic skepticism but acknowledgement that moral truth is a different kind of knowing and requires its own standards of inquiry and justification. In effect, morality and ethics are philosophically independent and must be evaluated within their system. The most fundamental questions about morality and ethics are moral questions not metaphysical. For example, if we are going to argue that gay marriage is always wrong, we must base that argument on moral arguments. Philosophers are often uncomfortable with this claim, arguing that it is "quietism" (p. 25).
From Kant, D draws further, stating that a successful, well-lived life comes from dignity and self-respect that arises only from respect for humanity itself. So, Kan'ts principle, according to D, is that it is from a deep regard for human dignity that our happiness is predicated. In this conception, morality and ethics are unified. Through treating others with dignity (morality) we live a good live (ethics).
Part I
Independence, p. 21
Truth in Morals
"The Ordinary View" is the belief that some moral opinions are objectively true, p. 27
D argues in this chapter that in order to judge moral systems you need to judge them from within the morality system itself. You can not use external sources of judgment.
Moral judgments are true when they are made true through an "adequate moral argument for their truth" (p. 37). The emphasis is on adequate. Not all arguments are adequate. We are responsible for thinking about the argument in the right way
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