Is motherhood altruism?
De Waal states, "mammalian maternal care is the costliest, longest lasting investment in other beings known to nature" (p. 49).
Earlier I posted on "why have kids". Is it simply altruism? Again, I'm not comfortable with understanding altruism this way at all. No one knows the "cost" before they do it so it can't be they have make an active choice to give up so much to altruistic care for another being. Plus, so much parenting seems to come from selfish desires--pass on your name, have someone to care for you when you grow old, make you feel loved.
Further, much parenting is "bad" in that it's neglectful, abusive, self centered, etc. Or is that still altruistic to the extent that the child survives?
De Waal sites Patricia Churchland, so I hunted down her work on the net to see what it contributes. I started with an essay in the Chronicle of Higher Education about Churchland, http://chronicle.com/article/The-Biology-of-Ethics/127789/. Churchland argues that "all philosophy must be neurophilosophy" meaning that you cannot separate the brain hardware (neurons, cells, etc) from its software (thinking). They are tied together, which means somehow our thinking has to have a neurological genesis. For Churchland, the neurological connection to altruism is oxytocin (which is also, apparently, the chemical the cements the bond between mother and infant). She also mentions some other neurochemicals that are involved, including endogenous opiates that make you feel good (maybe that's why I give money to homeless people--see earlier post).
The article says she is anti Rawls and his A Theory of Justice (here is one summary of the theory http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Rawlschaps1and2.pdf) , but regardless of whether oxytocin can be proven to play a big part in either altruism and/or mother infant bond does not preclude developing systems of justice to counter other neurochemicals that might tell us not to help other people (who we don't get a rush of good feeling from helping, or who we are mad at, or who we've developed social constructs against). Rawls Theory of Justice is simply a way to create a structure that our human foibles are less likely to screw up, isn't it? As I understand Rawls, he is arguing that there needs to be an agreed upon bottom under which no one in a society is allowed to fall. This bottom is determined by the individuals deciding what's the lowest they would want themselves or someone they loved to go.
What I don't get in Churchland's arguments (as I understand them from this review) is regardless of whether her conclusions are valid or not, there are many times when the oxytocin is not flowing and people are still in need. Society has to have "artificial" ways to deal with that (Churchland's what is prudent at a given moment and a given time seems entirely to dependent on how people are feeling then--it sounds good but I'd hate to be on the receiving end of that kind of generosity over the long term). Humans may have a moral sense, but not all of us, all of the time. Extrapolating from prairie voles (where those with more oxytocin are more likely to care for their young), Churchland concludes that oxytocin might explain morality in humans.
What humans "naturally" do or what apes "naturally" do is not necessarily what we would have them do. . .
Earlier I posted on "why have kids". Is it simply altruism? Again, I'm not comfortable with understanding altruism this way at all. No one knows the "cost" before they do it so it can't be they have make an active choice to give up so much to altruistic care for another being. Plus, so much parenting seems to come from selfish desires--pass on your name, have someone to care for you when you grow old, make you feel loved.
Further, much parenting is "bad" in that it's neglectful, abusive, self centered, etc. Or is that still altruistic to the extent that the child survives?
De Waal sites Patricia Churchland, so I hunted down her work on the net to see what it contributes. I started with an essay in the Chronicle of Higher Education about Churchland, http://chronicle.com/article/The-Biology-of-Ethics/127789/. Churchland argues that "all philosophy must be neurophilosophy" meaning that you cannot separate the brain hardware (neurons, cells, etc) from its software (thinking). They are tied together, which means somehow our thinking has to have a neurological genesis. For Churchland, the neurological connection to altruism is oxytocin (which is also, apparently, the chemical the cements the bond between mother and infant). She also mentions some other neurochemicals that are involved, including endogenous opiates that make you feel good (maybe that's why I give money to homeless people--see earlier post).
The article says she is anti Rawls and his A Theory of Justice (here is one summary of the theory http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Rawlschaps1and2.pdf) , but regardless of whether oxytocin can be proven to play a big part in either altruism and/or mother infant bond does not preclude developing systems of justice to counter other neurochemicals that might tell us not to help other people (who we don't get a rush of good feeling from helping, or who we are mad at, or who we've developed social constructs against). Rawls Theory of Justice is simply a way to create a structure that our human foibles are less likely to screw up, isn't it? As I understand Rawls, he is arguing that there needs to be an agreed upon bottom under which no one in a society is allowed to fall. This bottom is determined by the individuals deciding what's the lowest they would want themselves or someone they loved to go.
What I don't get in Churchland's arguments (as I understand them from this review) is regardless of whether her conclusions are valid or not, there are many times when the oxytocin is not flowing and people are still in need. Society has to have "artificial" ways to deal with that (Churchland's what is prudent at a given moment and a given time seems entirely to dependent on how people are feeling then--it sounds good but I'd hate to be on the receiving end of that kind of generosity over the long term). Humans may have a moral sense, but not all of us, all of the time. Extrapolating from prairie voles (where those with more oxytocin are more likely to care for their young), Churchland concludes that oxytocin might explain morality in humans.
What humans "naturally" do or what apes "naturally" do is not necessarily what we would have them do. . .
Comments
Post a Comment