qbism and existential phenomenology
Wild speculation on some ideas:
Is there a way the qbism (quantum Bayesian--or the idea that probability has degrees of belief) can underlie existential phenomenology? If existential phenomenology holds the idea that we live only in the experienced universe (it does no good to imagine or harken to that which is not experienced because it cannot be known--even the experienced is known only as that--the experience) and that in that experienced universe there are certain, existential "truths": we will all die, the world is unpredictable, human being is always with others but essentially alone (of course, most of these "truths" are all physical truths). Added to the truths are the notions that the self is an engaged being, making choices that he/she is responsible for. Humans are objects that be and in that "be-ing" they become subjects. Humans experience the world not as it is but as it appears to them. These two are never merged--that is what is is never what appears. Here is the interference of quantum physics, which makes it impossible to uncover the "real".
And, if qbism focuses on the fact that physics has combined the subjective experience with the object, interpreting theories as if they depend on human agency instead of looking at the world and the agent as separate, it seems like they could/do relate. At first, they seem in some sense dichotomous. Can the object and subject ever be separated?
But the question comes at the concept from two different angles. In existential phenomenology, we are talking about what the subject experiences--that experience can never be separated from the object. They are entangled. I think qbism agrees from the human perspective, but argues that what physics is about is what the world is without the subjective. For example, in Shrodinger's cat, qbism would argue that what we are looking at is the experience of the viewer that the cat is both dead or alive, but the cat is in no case dead or alive or in some weird dead/alive limbo. And, in fact, when the viewer looks in the box, the cat is dead or alive. The wave functions are products of human thinking not of quantum physics. They are separate. So, I think Fuchs would say that physics should be looking for what that separate thing is (is that possible?).
Is there a way to develop theories outside of what we experience? or is there a way to detect that which is outside of our experience? What is left if you take away experience?
In existential phenomenology, what we "know" is experience in the sense that we interpret what we observe and experience but before the interpretation there is the experience itself. Are they hopelessly entangled?
Would it make sense to have degrees of belief about our own life? "I think I feel badly, more or less"? If we just "feel" without interpretation is that the object without the subjective interpretation?
If the minute we describe what is, we change what is, what really is? And is "being in" an experience different from interpreting the experience?
In phenomenology, we return to the essence of things--how they are in experience. But in qbism, there is a place even before this: how the object is in its quantum state. The minute they enter experience, they are subjective. What is the essence of Schrodinger's cat?
What does physics have to say to philosophy?
Is reading literature or interpreting it a way of "being in the world"?
Is there a way the qbism (quantum Bayesian--or the idea that probability has degrees of belief) can underlie existential phenomenology? If existential phenomenology holds the idea that we live only in the experienced universe (it does no good to imagine or harken to that which is not experienced because it cannot be known--even the experienced is known only as that--the experience) and that in that experienced universe there are certain, existential "truths": we will all die, the world is unpredictable, human being is always with others but essentially alone (of course, most of these "truths" are all physical truths). Added to the truths are the notions that the self is an engaged being, making choices that he/she is responsible for. Humans are objects that be and in that "be-ing" they become subjects. Humans experience the world not as it is but as it appears to them. These two are never merged--that is what is is never what appears. Here is the interference of quantum physics, which makes it impossible to uncover the "real".
And, if qbism focuses on the fact that physics has combined the subjective experience with the object, interpreting theories as if they depend on human agency instead of looking at the world and the agent as separate, it seems like they could/do relate. At first, they seem in some sense dichotomous. Can the object and subject ever be separated?
But the question comes at the concept from two different angles. In existential phenomenology, we are talking about what the subject experiences--that experience can never be separated from the object. They are entangled. I think qbism agrees from the human perspective, but argues that what physics is about is what the world is without the subjective. For example, in Shrodinger's cat, qbism would argue that what we are looking at is the experience of the viewer that the cat is both dead or alive, but the cat is in no case dead or alive or in some weird dead/alive limbo. And, in fact, when the viewer looks in the box, the cat is dead or alive. The wave functions are products of human thinking not of quantum physics. They are separate. So, I think Fuchs would say that physics should be looking for what that separate thing is (is that possible?).
Is there a way to develop theories outside of what we experience? or is there a way to detect that which is outside of our experience? What is left if you take away experience?
In existential phenomenology, what we "know" is experience in the sense that we interpret what we observe and experience but before the interpretation there is the experience itself. Are they hopelessly entangled?
Would it make sense to have degrees of belief about our own life? "I think I feel badly, more or less"? If we just "feel" without interpretation is that the object without the subjective interpretation?
If the minute we describe what is, we change what is, what really is? And is "being in" an experience different from interpreting the experience?
In phenomenology, we return to the essence of things--how they are in experience. But in qbism, there is a place even before this: how the object is in its quantum state. The minute they enter experience, they are subjective. What is the essence of Schrodinger's cat?
What does physics have to say to philosophy?
Is reading literature or interpreting it a way of "being in the world"?
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