Notes on "Bohr's Conception of the Quantum Mechanical State of a System . . ." by Henry J Folse
Bohr developed the idea of complementarity. Complementarity has come to mean the Copenhagen Interpretation (CI), although that's not what Bohr called it. The CI holds that in a quantum state, the observing system is part of the object system; they are complementary to one another.
Bohr wanted an epistemological system (how we think about quantum physics) and not an ontological system (how quantum physics is or bes).
F goes back to Aristotle to explain Bohr's position. Aristotle believed there were fundamental properties (essences) that made up all objects. For A, we experience the world "as it is" and it is as we experience it. (Very phenomenological).
With Newton, it was believed if you knew the speed (kinematic) and causes of changes in the speed (dynamical), you knew all you needed for a mechanical description of an object. These are the "objective" properties necessary.
Objective in classical physics meant those properties that the object possessed (primary properties), which existed separate from the observer. all other qualities (secondary properties) exist in the mind of the observer.
Bohr argued from 1913 onward that in the atomic model there are two inherent aspects: information about atomic systems comes through their interactions which are discontinous (meaning that we cannot know its state at the next moment--it is non-determined); when they are not interacting they exist in a "stationary state" but the minute we observe them this is an interaction so we can never "see" them in their stationary state. Observations about stationary states are "purely theoretical abstractions" (p. 7).
(If the actual interactions are not pre determined does this mean they are random? And, does this mean the universe is not pre determined or does this just mean WE cannot determine them but the universe meanwhile is continuing along its determined path?)
How we define "objectivity" must change with Bohr's observations. The author argues that objectivity can no longer be grounded in the actual "being" of the object (its ontological state) but must be grounded it how it is thought to be (its epistemological state). The language we use to describe our observations, thus, is pragmatic rather than foundational--its an agreed upon and shared framework but it does not exist in its essence somewhere.
(I don't think Bohr is saying here, as Stapp argues, that this tells us how humans "are" (or be) but it just tells us that our observations are in relationship to us as observers and while objects do exist outside of us are apprehension of them is entangled with our observing. Doesn't seem to be saying anything about "the self"?)
This move from ontology to epistemology tells us how we observe the universe but it does not tell us what the universe is. The author argues that it is our persistence in understanding objectivity as ontological that leads us to conclude that the cat is both dead and not dead. The cat is in a quantum state and our observations are still in a classical state. We cannot move from the observed state to the isolated state of the object. There is no isolated state of the object as observed (even though we treat objects as such). We need to recognize that in the quantum state, we are looking at a system in interaction. Objects are not, as observed, isolated. From this conclusion, the author adds that we have to acknowledge that these interactions do not have a determined outcome and "indeterminacy is a real aspect of nature" (p. 11).
The author states "By our free choice in designing a particular experiment we bring about the occurrence of a particular phenomenon" (p. 9). But in what way is this choice "free"? This statement seems congruent with Stapp's, "These mental intentions are "freely chosen", in the sense that they are not determined withint the theory by prior physical properties" (all quotes from Stapp come from Quantum Physics Meets Philosophy of Mind, June 4, 2013, from http://www.informationphilosopher.com/presentations/Milan/schedule.html).
If mental intentions are "freely chosen" does this follow that mind is something other than brain?
Stapp talks about this separate "ego" that "are ontologically separated from the physical world" (p. 11), which just makes no sense to me. Where are they then? I don't get what a "mental" part of nature is (p. 15).
See Ulrich Mohrhoff, The World According to Quantum Mechanics (or, the 18 errors of Henry P Stapp)
Bohr wanted an epistemological system (how we think about quantum physics) and not an ontological system (how quantum physics is or bes).
F goes back to Aristotle to explain Bohr's position. Aristotle believed there were fundamental properties (essences) that made up all objects. For A, we experience the world "as it is" and it is as we experience it. (Very phenomenological).
With Newton, it was believed if you knew the speed (kinematic) and causes of changes in the speed (dynamical), you knew all you needed for a mechanical description of an object. These are the "objective" properties necessary.
Objective in classical physics meant those properties that the object possessed (primary properties), which existed separate from the observer. all other qualities (secondary properties) exist in the mind of the observer.
Bohr argued from 1913 onward that in the atomic model there are two inherent aspects: information about atomic systems comes through their interactions which are discontinous (meaning that we cannot know its state at the next moment--it is non-determined); when they are not interacting they exist in a "stationary state" but the minute we observe them this is an interaction so we can never "see" them in their stationary state. Observations about stationary states are "purely theoretical abstractions" (p. 7).
(If the actual interactions are not pre determined does this mean they are random? And, does this mean the universe is not pre determined or does this just mean WE cannot determine them but the universe meanwhile is continuing along its determined path?)
How we define "objectivity" must change with Bohr's observations. The author argues that objectivity can no longer be grounded in the actual "being" of the object (its ontological state) but must be grounded it how it is thought to be (its epistemological state). The language we use to describe our observations, thus, is pragmatic rather than foundational--its an agreed upon and shared framework but it does not exist in its essence somewhere.
(I don't think Bohr is saying here, as Stapp argues, that this tells us how humans "are" (or be) but it just tells us that our observations are in relationship to us as observers and while objects do exist outside of us are apprehension of them is entangled with our observing. Doesn't seem to be saying anything about "the self"?)
This move from ontology to epistemology tells us how we observe the universe but it does not tell us what the universe is. The author argues that it is our persistence in understanding objectivity as ontological that leads us to conclude that the cat is both dead and not dead. The cat is in a quantum state and our observations are still in a classical state. We cannot move from the observed state to the isolated state of the object. There is no isolated state of the object as observed (even though we treat objects as such). We need to recognize that in the quantum state, we are looking at a system in interaction. Objects are not, as observed, isolated. From this conclusion, the author adds that we have to acknowledge that these interactions do not have a determined outcome and "indeterminacy is a real aspect of nature" (p. 11).
The author states "By our free choice in designing a particular experiment we bring about the occurrence of a particular phenomenon" (p. 9). But in what way is this choice "free"? This statement seems congruent with Stapp's, "These mental intentions are "freely chosen", in the sense that they are not determined withint the theory by prior physical properties" (all quotes from Stapp come from Quantum Physics Meets Philosophy of Mind, June 4, 2013, from http://www.informationphilosopher.com/presentations/Milan/schedule.html).
If mental intentions are "freely chosen" does this follow that mind is something other than brain?
Stapp talks about this separate "ego" that "are ontologically separated from the physical world" (p. 11), which just makes no sense to me. Where are they then? I don't get what a "mental" part of nature is (p. 15).
See Ulrich Mohrhoff, The World According to Quantum Mechanics (or, the 18 errors of Henry P Stapp)
Comments
Post a Comment