notes on Righteous Mind

Haidt argues that our mind is divided between an elephant (intuition) and the driver (reason). The elephant leads and the driver convinces himself that he is leading.  Because of the power of the elephant, it is very difficult for us to change our minds. We get a hold of beliefs and justify them at all costs.

Just because lots of people are religious does not mean that there is a God. It might be indicative of something in our biology that selects for that kind of mystical belief. I need to understand evolution better. I thought evolution was the drive of cells to reproduce--not the drive of individuals or, as Haidt argues, groups to reproduce.  It certainly isn't the drive to be happy. I think Haidt gets incredibly sloppy in his discussion of how biology/evolution drives his argument. Were human groups selected over human individuals?--or were traits in our species selected. We created our environment at the same time that our environment was shaping us--so the environment created to favor groups may have contributed to group behavior without it having anything to do with evolution.  Not sure why he needs this argument anyway.

Descartes Error--reasoning requires passion. We cannot reason in an emotionless vacuum.

Two kinds of cognition: intuition and reasoning, p. 45. Reason is the servant of intuition.  Haidt states "emotion is filled with cognition". He defines cognition as "information processing", p. 44.  Moral judgement is a cognitive process (but much more besides right--if all it is is information processing than computers could do it).  He spends the book describing moral judgement, not prescribing it.  Interesting distinction--is he saying that because this is what it is, this is what it should be?

In order to change intuition, argument through logic/reason does not work, you must be a persuader and see things from the other person's perspective

States that the "divinity view" is easily justified with observation and evidence? np. 107 Not at all convinced of this. Maybe you can justify it with intuition? He argues that the divinity view gives us a "valuable perspective from which we can understand and critique some of the ugly parts of secular societies" (p. 106). This does not make it necessary or desirable. Do we adopt something because it provides a useful tool even if it provides lots of more serious problems and other tools could do the same job?

He states the religious right "makes sense" (p. 108). In what way? What does he mean here by "makes sense?". If evidence exists against their positions (spanking, for instance), then how does believing it make sense? By make sense does he mean fits with the elephant?  It "feels" right?

He states ""selfish genes can give rise to generous creatures as long as those creatures are selective int heir generosity" (p. 136). Isn't this just an error in thinking?  Genes do not work together in an organism to create some kind of trait, do they?  It's random and it's the gene that is selfish not the organism.  What happens in the organism because of the genes selfishness the gene does not care about, does it?

Dawkins on The Selfish Gene: "The best way to explain the title is by locating the emphasis. Emphasize ‘selfish’ and you will think the book is about selfishness, whereas, if anything, it devotes more attention to altruism. The correct word of the title to stress is ‘gene’ and let me explain why. A central debate within Darwinism concerns the unit that is actually selected: what kind of entity is it that survives, or does not survive, as a consequence of natural selection. That unit will become, more or less by definition, ‘selfish’. Altruism might well be favoured at other levels. Does natural selection choose between species? If so, we might expect individual organisms to behave altruistically ‘for the good of the species’. They might limit their birth rates to avoid overpopulation, or restrain their hunting behaviour to conserve the species’ future stocks of prey. It was such widely disseminated misunderstandings of Darwinism that originally provoked me to write the book.

Or does natural selection, as I urge instead here, choose between genes? In this case, we should not be surprised to find individual organisms behaving altruistically ‘for the good of the genes’, for example by feeding and protecting kin who are likely to share copies of the same genes. Such kin altruism is only one way in which gene selfishness can translate itself into individual altruism. This book explains how it works, together with reciprocation, Darwinian theory's other main generator of altruism. If I were ever to rewrite the book, as a late convert to the Zahavi/Grafen ‘handicap principle’ (see pages 309–313) I should also give some space to Amotz Zahavi's idea that altruistic donation might be a ‘Potlatch’ style of dominance signal: see how superior to you I am, I can afford to make a donation to you!

Let me repeat and expand the rationale for the word ‘selfish’ in the title. The critical question is which level in the hierarchy of life will turn out to be the inevitably ‘selfish’ level, at which natural selection acts? The Selfish Species? The Selfish Group? The Selfish Organism? The Selfish Ecosystem? Most of these could be argued, and most have been uncritically assumed by one or another author, but all of them are wrong. Given that the Darwinian message is going to be pithily encapsulated as The Selfish Something, that something turns out to be the gene, for cogent reasons which this book argues. Whether or not  {ix}  you end up buying the argument itself, that is the explanation for the title."

Is he asking for understanding across the divide? Is he claiming that both sides are 'equally right"?  Given what set of values? And is the moral structure they only thing we use to judge which is better? Other values seem to intrude as well. What outcome do conservatives want? What outcome liberals? And doesn't just posing those questions raise a major problem--don't people want lots of different things in different situations?

Liberals are not "against authority" but they disagree with how authority should be gained and maintained, p. 144

Is he taking a truly "relativistic standpoint"? That as long as we can "understand" the other side, the other side is okay?

When does the disgust structure become pathology?  Are some reactions of disgust wrong or are they all just cultural?

Durkheim: individual cannot police him/herself but needs society vs. Mill individual can police him/her self. Haidt needs a continuum of more or less policing self as opposed to one or the other. p. 167

Are conservatives driven by the belief that things should be as they ought to be regardless of reality or complexity?  Maybe the better way to put it is conservatives want a simple view of the world while liberals thrive on complexity. Where would that fit in a moral framework.  For example, the conservative cry "don't tread on me" is completely out of touch with reality. All of us are daily "tread" on in ways that we would never give up. Yet, the ignorance that underlies that cry it seems Haidt just dismisses.

Hard to buy the evidence of these games where people pay or punish others because they are games. If I were playing I would be thinking this is just stupid and they are simplistic as well. His quizzes are too. So reductive.

Argues that real life violates the axiom that we all act out of self-interest. But that depends entirely on how you define self interest. He does not define it so I'm not sure how he sees it.  But giving something to someone else is not necessarily proof against self interest. p. 197. Acting in the interests of the group does not necessarily go against the interests of the self.  And, in fact, in many cases is in the interest of the self.  India's caste system is groups writ large and it benefited lots of individuals and perhaps created an "orderly" and "moral" society on some of his dimensions but would anyone argue, from the outside, that it was the "right" system?  Now, we can say well the people in the castes wanted it. They liked the feeling or order or belonging or whatever and that's fine. But that doesn't make it "right"?

Whole hive switch chapter was disturbing.  Why does he need to argue this is some evolutionary adaptation?  Then he conflates it with love of the environment which just seems like really sloppy reasoning.  If endorphins fire when we do wild things in groups does that mean these things are necessarily good or beneficial?  The same feeling might be got from doing something on your own (skydiving, for example) and yet how does that fit his argument?  You could just as easily argue that groups are reinforcing for other reasons--fear of being alone (atavistic fear), fear of being killed because you aren't part of the group since we seem to abhor outsiders, desire for the power the group gives?

His definition of moral systems: work towards regulating and suppressing self interest to make cooperative societies possible, p. 270. But, who gets left out and what is lost in this focus? I disagree with this definition which I guess is why I fundamentally have problems with the book.  Cooperative societies can be terrible, would they still be "moral"? Doesn't moral imply some notion of "good"?  Is he saying the highest good is "cooperative society"?  Perhaps I would define a moral system as one that works towards granting respect to all while encouraging responsibility and kindness?

definition of something that is innate: organized in advance of experience, p. 278. Uses that term to talk about innate traits at birth.

Steps toward the development of the self (p, 282):

1. genes make brains

2. traits make paths

3. people construct life narratives

Libertarians are liberals who love markets and lack bleeding hearts, p. 301

What I see Haidt arguing is. 

1. Mind is divided between the elephant (intuition) and the driver, reason. With the elephant doing the leading and the driver trying to find ways to convince him/herself he/she is doing the leading.
2. that there are six moral structures that humans use. It is more useful to look at this broad moral system that combines reason and human nature (relying more on Hume, p. 114) rather than the "prescriptive"systems of Kant and Mill.
3. Liberals tend to use the care/harm structure more than conservatives. Both groups emphasize justice and fairness (but liberals emphasize care in fairness and conservatives emphasize proportionality, p. 169). Conservatives also emphasize loyalty/betrayl, authority/subversion and sanctity/degradation.
4. Groups/hive action is very important to moral thinking. Humans function best in groups. Liberals want to get rid of groups or find them dangerous. Religion is an essential part of forming groups and thus increasing morality
5. If Liberals understood the thinking/emotion behind conservative emphasis on the three later structures, they wouldn't be so dismissive of them. Liberals have to get beyond the care/harm moral structure.
6. If we are going to find common ground we must first see the other perspective and then become persuaders

Limitations

1. If (and big "if") this is an accurate picture of most people's moral reasoning, it does not mean we need to accept it.  Is this the best picture?
2. To what extent does Haidt reduce something incredibly complex into a simple model that works well in a book but doesn't reflect reality?
3. While he acknowledges the limitations of the "group mentality" he does not address this in a satisfactory way.  Groups resist diversity he seems to suggest so maybe we shouldn't encourage diversity. But that resistance is a step towards broader acceptance. You can see him slipping into the conservative framework of accepting things as they are because "they work" or "worked in the past" as opposed to see that the struggle and the chaos and the anger are necessary steps toward change.
4. A lot of his thinking is dichotomous--it's either this or that. We either have religion or we don't have a tool to critique secular society. Other options are available.
5. The six moral structures do not seem equal to me. Seems like there needs to be some hierarchy?  Are all moral systems of the same value?  Hard to argue though because of his descriptive stance--if this is how people act and he is just describing that, then we can only say in argument against him: this is not how they should act. Of course, we must ask: is this how people act?
6. His arguments to support a biological justification for the hive seem to be based on an inaccurate reading of evolution (see Dawkins, The Seflish Gene).  
7. His definition of moral systems: work towards regulating and suppressing self interest to make cooperative societies possible, p. 270. But, who gets left out and what is lost in this focus? I disagree with this definition which I guess is why I fundamentally have problems with the book.  Cooperative societies can be terrible, would they still be "moral"? Doesn't moral imply some notion of "good"?  Is he saying the highest good is "cooperative society"?  Perhaps I would define a moral system as one that works towards granting respect to all while encouraging responsibility and kindness?

Advantages

1. There is nothing to be lost from attempting to understand how others develop their perspective

2. Understanding how we get our belief systems is useful. Does seem to have a somewhat complex view of how people end up with their moral framework