Notes on Dual Aspect Monism, Harold Atmanspacher

Link to the article

vocab:
a priori--independent of experience, knowledge that comes before experience
monism: denies the distinction between mind and matter
Bistable--two stable states
metaphysical: outside of human sense perception (never could understand this word--how do you know of it if it is outside human sense perception?)
episteme: justified true belief, empirical access to prove
ontic: refers to what is there, does this mean something physical?
complimentarity: the idea that two separate theories are required to explain physics (or any phenomena)
boolean propositions: yes no propositions
Neutral monists--mind and matter reduce to an underlying neutral domain where particular configurations of elements underlie each; the underlying domain is neither mental nor material (hmm. . . what's left?) and is only apprehended indirectly manifested through its aspects (does this mean contexts?); mind and matter are separate, tend to nurture metaphysical conceptions of the underlying domain
dual aspect monists--mind and matter are 2 basic irreducible aspects of the underlying domain (more foundational than neutral monists believe?); the underlying domain is neither mental nor material; mind and matter are tied together; aspects depend on justified true belief (not sure what that means); reference pure, raw methods of experiencing the domain; can be apprehended directly

Neutral monists believe that there is a reality that is inaccessible to direct sensory experience but can be accessed indirectly with empirical tools


Pauli and Jung connected physics and psychology to suggest both had a subjective, inaccessible aspect that both disciplines attempt to study. And the notion of complemntarity that Bohr adopts to describe physics was originally coined by William James to refer to the two stable states of perception of ambiguous stimuli.

In dual aspect monism, mind and matter have complementarity because both are necessary to understand the aspect but only one is accessible in any given context.
Pauli posits that physics and psychology might be complementary aspects of the same reality (p. 6); both are necessary to understand the reality but only one apprehends in a given context. Some phenomena from one perspective might be seen as physical while from another aspect might be seen as mental.

So if the ontic is what is behind the epistemic (the ontic "proves" the epistemic), the ontic is only measurable and observable indirectly. In physics, this background is the "holistic state of a system prior to the transition to a measured state" (p. 13) and in psychology its the unconscious before the conscious apprehends it. So, this is saying that what we apprehend either in physics or in psychology we can only apprehend indirectly.

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