Notes on Why Quantum Mechanics is Hard by Doug Bilodeau
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The answer? Quantum mechanics is hard because it "pushes us to the limits of the very idea of the physical" (p. 1).
B compares our innate language ability to a possibly innate mathematical and physical concept understanding ability (not that we innately can do math; which most of us can't) but that we are hardwired to understand mathematical concepts in certain ways
Einstein's theory of relativity was pointing out how physical concepts are limited by the nature of observation. Our ability to "access" the world as it is (reality), is limited. What we "access" is somehow different than what "is"
"An object is like a river of events and appearances which we see as a persisting unity" (p. 2). It is like? or it is? Objects tend to be continuous and are verifiable and their construction allows us to have an "objective" reality (a shared reality that has some commonality across viewers--even if it's not an entirely accurate reality).
Physics is interested in the physical world but moves beyond the object to the abstract principles of the phenomena in relationship to other objects. The abstraction of theories are one step removed from the actual reality (only one step?).
The world we "be" in is enmeshed (entangled?). Nothing "be" separate from anything else. All being is in relationship to. This world is also always dynamic and moving towards greater entropy.
B says, "These are two irreducible aspects of physical description which evolve together--historical and dynamical" (p. 4). an object is "historical" in that it exists and can be observed in space and time. It is dynamical in that it is part of a "dynamical theory which explains causal relationships between objects" (p. 4), which I take to mean that it has abstract properties that "define" it in relationships to other objects. Quantum entities can be both (I thought he said everything is always both in the quote above "two irreducible aspects"?).
Science attempts to abstract universal or generalizable laws from observing what are, in fact, unique events. Nothing ever happens twice the same. Science uses the tools that are at hand--measurement of what we can set up and control. We cannot measure what we don't know or if we do measure it we aren't sure what it is we measured. And our measurement tools may not be fit to measure everything. . .
We attempt to understand by taking apart and reducing an object to the smallest, measurable parts. These smallest parts are quanta, fundamental units of interaction (and thus are dynamical). They are not discrete bits of matter; they are always in relationship to. We find out what the quantum fields do but they are never reduced to individual parts (but are there individual parts?).
The classical world observes objects made of particles with given trajectories and given, definable properties. This is not the quantum world. The wave function tells us the probability of the dynamical relationship among objects. b calls this the configuration space, and it is different from the historical space in classical physics. The configuration space indicates "a particular 'dynamical partition' of the physical world" (p. 6). One possible configuration in a world of many (infinite). Objects in the quantum world do not exist in a historical plane because they are probable. Well, they may exist in the historical plane but they can't be measured there because there are many possible outcomes.
There is not a classical physics world of big things and a quantum physics world of small things. All objects are in the quantum world and we should assume that quantum physics will work on all objects IF we could to the calculations (why can't we? Will we ever be able to?)
There is an independent physical reality even if it cannot be measured. Objects be even if we cannot describe the quantum state of being but can only describe its dynamical state (what does this mean?). We experience the being of objects and this experience is "real".
States: "Physics gives a complete dynamical description of all phenomena. . . That doesn't mean physics explains all higher level emergent phenomena (consciousness, culture, morality) or that it should be expected to. Nor does it provide an underlying ontology for reality in all its aspects" (p. 10).
How "be" higher level emergent phenomena? How can physics not explain these? Are they something outside of the physical universe? What does he mean?
I understand the second statement: physics does not provide a foundational description of "being" of reality. It tells how things act.
The answer? Quantum mechanics is hard because it "pushes us to the limits of the very idea of the physical" (p. 1).
B compares our innate language ability to a possibly innate mathematical and physical concept understanding ability (not that we innately can do math; which most of us can't) but that we are hardwired to understand mathematical concepts in certain ways
Einstein's theory of relativity was pointing out how physical concepts are limited by the nature of observation. Our ability to "access" the world as it is (reality), is limited. What we "access" is somehow different than what "is"
"An object is like a river of events and appearances which we see as a persisting unity" (p. 2). It is like? or it is? Objects tend to be continuous and are verifiable and their construction allows us to have an "objective" reality (a shared reality that has some commonality across viewers--even if it's not an entirely accurate reality).
Physics is interested in the physical world but moves beyond the object to the abstract principles of the phenomena in relationship to other objects. The abstraction of theories are one step removed from the actual reality (only one step?).
The world we "be" in is enmeshed (entangled?). Nothing "be" separate from anything else. All being is in relationship to. This world is also always dynamic and moving towards greater entropy.
B says, "These are two irreducible aspects of physical description which evolve together--historical and dynamical" (p. 4). an object is "historical" in that it exists and can be observed in space and time. It is dynamical in that it is part of a "dynamical theory which explains causal relationships between objects" (p. 4), which I take to mean that it has abstract properties that "define" it in relationships to other objects. Quantum entities can be both (I thought he said everything is always both in the quote above "two irreducible aspects"?).
Science attempts to abstract universal or generalizable laws from observing what are, in fact, unique events. Nothing ever happens twice the same. Science uses the tools that are at hand--measurement of what we can set up and control. We cannot measure what we don't know or if we do measure it we aren't sure what it is we measured. And our measurement tools may not be fit to measure everything. . .
We attempt to understand by taking apart and reducing an object to the smallest, measurable parts. These smallest parts are quanta, fundamental units of interaction (and thus are dynamical). They are not discrete bits of matter; they are always in relationship to. We find out what the quantum fields do but they are never reduced to individual parts (but are there individual parts?).
The classical world observes objects made of particles with given trajectories and given, definable properties. This is not the quantum world. The wave function tells us the probability of the dynamical relationship among objects. b calls this the configuration space, and it is different from the historical space in classical physics. The configuration space indicates "a particular 'dynamical partition' of the physical world" (p. 6). One possible configuration in a world of many (infinite). Objects in the quantum world do not exist in a historical plane because they are probable. Well, they may exist in the historical plane but they can't be measured there because there are many possible outcomes.
There is not a classical physics world of big things and a quantum physics world of small things. All objects are in the quantum world and we should assume that quantum physics will work on all objects IF we could to the calculations (why can't we? Will we ever be able to?)
There is an independent physical reality even if it cannot be measured. Objects be even if we cannot describe the quantum state of being but can only describe its dynamical state (what does this mean?). We experience the being of objects and this experience is "real".
States: "Physics gives a complete dynamical description of all phenomena. . . That doesn't mean physics explains all higher level emergent phenomena (consciousness, culture, morality) or that it should be expected to. Nor does it provide an underlying ontology for reality in all its aspects" (p. 10).
How "be" higher level emergent phenomena? How can physics not explain these? Are they something outside of the physical universe? What does he mean?
I understand the second statement: physics does not provide a foundational description of "being" of reality. It tells how things act.
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