Notes on The World According to Quantum Mechanics, by Ulrich Mohroff
Link to article
Very poor understanding of this article. . .
Wanted to quote this whole paragraph because it seems so important:
"If “fact” is so fundamental a term that it cannot be de-
fined, the existence of facts—the factuality of events or
states of affairs—cannot be accounted for, any more than
we can explain why there is anything at all, rather than
nothing. (If something can be accounted for, it can be
defined in terms of whatever accounts for it.) Before the
mystery of existence—the existence of facts—we are left
with nothing but sheer dumbfoundment. Any attempt to
explain the emergence of facts (“the emergence of classicality,” as it is sometimes called) must therefore be a
wholly gratuitous endeavor" (p. 3).
Classical physics deals with worlds of possible general laws that are congruent with physical theory. It does not determine the world (and it does not wholly describe it). Observation identifies the unique world of any given moment among all the possible worlds.
QM looks at probabilities. These probabilities are not separate from the facts.
Seems to disagree with Fuchs: he states that the notion of subjectivity or the intervention of the conscious observer as part of the quantum domain is wrong. He seems to be saying there is an "objective reality".
Quantum states are not evolving states of affairs. Quantum states are probabilities. They just are.
There is an unaccounted for element but it is not subjectivity or consciousness. He states it "is the actuality of exactly one of all nomologically possible worlds" (p. 4), which I just don't understand. . . He adds it is what distinguishes the world from a theory about the world. . . So, what is unaccounted for is not the influence of the measurement but the probability that one over the other in all possible options is the one.
What he keeps emphasizing is that the probability or possibility of something is NOT ever separate from the something itself. the probability is itself the fact.
Making distinctions between the world in our mind and the objective world. Seems to believe there is an objective world that simply "is"; it bes. We perceive certain things happening in that objective world but those "happenings" are in our mind. The objective world meanwhile is just being.
does this mean there are no "causes?" as we use that term? Something in the past causes something in the future? Is causation just in our minds? He seems to be saying yes: "the fact that the future in a sense "already" exists is no reason why choices made by me at earlier times cannot be partly responsible for it" (but he does not mean that the future and the past and present are already in existence simultaneously but it simply exists--not sure exactly how this is. What is meant by the universe is expanding which seems to suggest it is doing it in time, but what is it really doing? Or is it doing at all?). He states, "Causality lies in the eye of the beholder" (p. 8). It is our way of interpreting events (which doesn't mean that it doesn't exist; our phenomenological experience exists as what it is, phenomenological experience). "Nothing in the physical world is necessitated by antecedent causes" (p. 9).
Distinguishes between "an experiencing phenomenal world" and a physical world. Seems to suggest these are separate.
States" all that the freedom to choose requires is the impossibility of knowing, at any one time, what is the case at a later time". So, if this is true, then in our phenomenological experiencing world freedom of choice exists. If by exists we mean we experience it so.
A bit of an exegesis on the argument between Stapp and Mohrhoff
Very poor understanding of this article. . .
Wanted to quote this whole paragraph because it seems so important:
"If “fact” is so fundamental a term that it cannot be de-
fined, the existence of facts—the factuality of events or
states of affairs—cannot be accounted for, any more than
we can explain why there is anything at all, rather than
nothing. (If something can be accounted for, it can be
defined in terms of whatever accounts for it.) Before the
mystery of existence—the existence of facts—we are left
with nothing but sheer dumbfoundment. Any attempt to
explain the emergence of facts (“the emergence of classicality,” as it is sometimes called) must therefore be a
wholly gratuitous endeavor" (p. 3).
Classical physics deals with worlds of possible general laws that are congruent with physical theory. It does not determine the world (and it does not wholly describe it). Observation identifies the unique world of any given moment among all the possible worlds.
QM looks at probabilities. These probabilities are not separate from the facts.
Seems to disagree with Fuchs: he states that the notion of subjectivity or the intervention of the conscious observer as part of the quantum domain is wrong. He seems to be saying there is an "objective reality".
Quantum states are not evolving states of affairs. Quantum states are probabilities. They just are.
There is an unaccounted for element but it is not subjectivity or consciousness. He states it "is the actuality of exactly one of all nomologically possible worlds" (p. 4), which I just don't understand. . . He adds it is what distinguishes the world from a theory about the world. . . So, what is unaccounted for is not the influence of the measurement but the probability that one over the other in all possible options is the one.
What he keeps emphasizing is that the probability or possibility of something is NOT ever separate from the something itself. the probability is itself the fact.
Making distinctions between the world in our mind and the objective world. Seems to believe there is an objective world that simply "is"; it bes. We perceive certain things happening in that objective world but those "happenings" are in our mind. The objective world meanwhile is just being.
does this mean there are no "causes?" as we use that term? Something in the past causes something in the future? Is causation just in our minds? He seems to be saying yes: "the fact that the future in a sense "already" exists is no reason why choices made by me at earlier times cannot be partly responsible for it" (but he does not mean that the future and the past and present are already in existence simultaneously but it simply exists--not sure exactly how this is. What is meant by the universe is expanding which seems to suggest it is doing it in time, but what is it really doing? Or is it doing at all?). He states, "Causality lies in the eye of the beholder" (p. 8). It is our way of interpreting events (which doesn't mean that it doesn't exist; our phenomenological experience exists as what it is, phenomenological experience). "Nothing in the physical world is necessitated by antecedent causes" (p. 9).
Distinguishes between "an experiencing phenomenal world" and a physical world. Seems to suggest these are separate.
States" all that the freedom to choose requires is the impossibility of knowing, at any one time, what is the case at a later time". So, if this is true, then in our phenomenological experiencing world freedom of choice exists. If by exists we mean we experience it so.
A bit of an exegesis on the argument between Stapp and Mohrhoff
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